

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700210001-7

**TOP SECRET**

EO

24 May 1958

25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25X1



25X1

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700210001-7

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

### Satellites Differ on Yugoslav Question

Hungarian, Rumanian and Polish comments on the Moscow-Belgrade dispute have emphasized "comradely criticism." They have avoided vituperation and, although fully adhering to basic bloc positions on "revisionism," have called for further interparty talks and continuance of amicable government-to-government relations. This reaction--which in the case of Hungary admittedly reflects "consternation" of party members over Yugoslav developments--is significantly different from the uncompromising stand taken by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

Comment in the official Hungarian party newspaper of 21 May, while closer to the Kremlin's position than Warsaw's guarded defiance, is nonetheless conciliatory. It calls for further discussions with the Yugoslav party "as between comrades" and warns Hungarian party members not to "backslide" to the vituperative line of the 1949 Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Hungarian article does condemn the Yugoslav party for its "anti-Marxist views," admits the 1948 resolution expelling Belgrade from the Cominform was "essentially" correct, and alleges Yugoslavia approved of the Hungarian revolution.

Rumania, like Hungary, apparently still desires to avoid direct involvement in the dispute. The official Rumanian comment on the Yugoslav question issued on 18 May avoided polemics while carefully siding with Moscow on the ideological questions in dispute.

Polish comment goes much further, approaching open disagreement with the Kremlin's line and even hinting that Moscow does not fully support the Chinese Communist denunciation of Tito. An 18 May article in Swiat i Polska, unofficial organ of the Foreign Ministry, declared that the Poles considered the isolation of Yugoslavia in 1948 "unjustified."


Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

Egyptian Activity in the Sudan

The UAR's subversive campaign against Sudanese Prime Minister Khalil's pro-Western government may be gaining strength, and events in Lebanon have apparently shaken the confidence of high Sudanese officials in their ability to resist a possible Egyptian effort to overthrow Khalil's coalition.

25X1



Egypt was apparently unchastened by the setback in prestige it suffered in the Sudanese border dispute last February and Khalil's subsequent parliamentary election victory over the pro-Egyptian National Unionist party.

25X6  
25X6

Disaffection of a relatively small number of members in the all-important house of representatives would threaten the slim majority now held by Khalil's Umma party in coalition with the People's Democratic party (PDP), which has its own small but troublesome pro-Egyptian wing.

Egypt is also reported to have been active in the southern Sudan, where resentment toward the central government is of long standing. Members of the Southern delegation in Parliament, on whom the coalition also depends for support, walked out of the 22 May session in protest against the form of the new constitution now being written. Their dissatisfaction with the government's stand against regional autonomy may make them amenable to Egyptian advances.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

There are increasing indications of friction and discord within the ranks of the dominant military and civilian extremists in Algeria and also between these elements and more moderate leaders who have been caught up in the recent developments there.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The American consul general in Algiers reports that as the stalemate continues, extremist civilian elements among the resident Europeans are beginning to envisage with equanimity a prolonged split with metropolitan France and even eventual secession. The army's only political objective, however, continues to be to bring about the desired change of regime in Paris, a goal to which General Salan committed himself more explicitly than heretofore when on 23 May he issued a statement saying the new all-Algeria committee had been formed to facilitate the establishment in Paris of a "government of public safety presided over by General de Gaulle." The Algiers leaders are not known to be planning to initiate in the near future any further action of a drastic nature to achieve this objective, but pressure for such action--which could conceivably take place in Tunisia, Algeria or France--may mount if the stalemate is of long duration.

25X1

25X1

### III. THE WEST

#### The French Crisis

Premier Pflimlin's proposals for strengthening the executive power appear already to be running into major parliamentary opposition. The decision of the National Assembly's steering committee to postpone discussion of the issue until 27 May probably reflects the basic distrust on the part of many deputies of any move curtailing their own powers, and may also indicate stronger opposition from the Independents than was anticipated. The Independents, including their top leaders Pinay and Senator Duchet, appear to be sliding more toward De Gaulle as the only alternative to a Popular Front.

According to some press reports, the French Communists are under pressure from Moscow to withdraw their support from Pflimlin. Since Soviet and French Communist propaganda has been proclaiming that Communist support for Pflimlin in the assembly has saved the Republic, it would be difficult for the Communists to reverse their position. They might, however, find a pretext in the constitutional issue, arguing that they have always opposed strengthening the executive.

There is renewed speculation that Pflimlin will make contact with De Gaulle this week end to discuss "the steps by which the general could assume power" if President Coty were to call him to form a National Union government.

Although Pflimlin still has a chance to retain office himself, a split or even a relative strengthening of the left in his broad parliamentary support would bolster the case of those urging a De Gaulle solution.

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X6

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700210001-7

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700210001-7

### Panama Still Tense

The state of siege declared on 22 May in Panama has not eliminated antigovernment activity in the capital. A disruptive general strike called by students and joined by several unions continues, and unidentified mob leaders have threatened renewed violence. At least 500 rebellious students are in control of the national university area--which is outside national guard jurisdiction--although many took refuge in the Canal Zone when armed hoodlums turned student demonstrations over school administration into rioting and terrorism.

The agitators who incited the crowds in Panama City and Colon reportedly were armed and directed by various groups anxious to oust President de la Guardia for business or political reasons and further to discredit the unpopular guard by goading it into repressive measures. These opposition forces are disparate in motive and distrustful of one another and would probably have difficulty working together. However, their initial success in arousing the public may encourage them to new efforts. They have often resorted to attacks on the United States position in the Canal Zone for political purposes in the past and have used De la Guardia's moderate approach to US relations against him.

National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino, who evidently made the decision to impose martial law and censorship, has arrested some of the alleged agitators and appears to be the strongest figure in Panama at present. He may insist that De la Guardia make some cabinet changes to ensure loyalty within the administration ranks.

25X1

25X1

25X1

**DISTRIBUTION****THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House****Special Assistant for National Security Affairs****Scientific Adviser to the President****Director of the Budget****Office of Defense Mobilization****Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination****Operations Coordinating Board****Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities****Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy****The Treasury Department****The Secretary of the Treasury****The Department of State****The Secretary of State****The Under Secretary of State****The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs****The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration****The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs****The Counselor****Director, International Cooperation Administration****Director of Intelligence and Research****The Department of Defense****The Secretary of Defense****The Deputy Secretary of Defense****The Secretary of the Army****The Secretary of the Navy****The Secretary of the Air Force****The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff****Commandant, United States Marine Corps****The Director, The Joint Staff****Chief of Staff, United States Army****Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy****Chief of Staff, United States Air Force****Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations****Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff****Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army****Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy****Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force****Supreme Allied Commander, Europe****Commander in Chief, Pacific****Federal Bureau of Investigation****The Director****Atomic Energy Commission****The Chairman****National Security Agency****The Director****National Indications Center****The Director****United States Information Agency****The Director**